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It is widely accepted that private information in ﬁnancial markets is revealed through trading and that information-motivated
traders, in an attempt to delay the full revelation of their information, look for ways to conceal their trading intentions.2 Barclay
and Warner (1993) (hereafter, BW93) study the trade-size choices of strategic informed traders. They introduce the Weighted
Price Contribution (WPC) approach to test the so-called stealth trading hypothesis (STH).3 TheWPCmeasures howmuch of a stock’s
cumulative price change over a given time period is attributable to trades grouped into particular trade-size categories. TheWPC has
become the standard tool to study strategic fragmentation of orders, and is frequently used as an alternative to parametricmethods to
measure price leadership (e.g., Hasbrouck, 1995).4
TheWPC assumes that price changes are primarily information-driven. The existence of a noisy component in price changes, one
of the milestones of market microstructure research (e.g., Hasbrouck, 2007), challenges theWPC approach. BW93 (p. 300) state that.
uib.es (R. Pascual).
re their positions by breaking up large trades and spreading them through time (Kyle, 1985); trading when
r, 1988); acting as passive liquidity providers (Harris, 1998, and Kaniel & Liu, 2006) or using undisclosed limit
, 2009).
te their trades in medium sizes, and stock-price movements are mainly due to private information revealed
cumulative price change will take place on medium size trades” (BW93, p. 282).
y (2000), Huang (2002), Barclay and Hendershott (2003, 2008), and Ellul, Shin, and Tonks (2005).
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studies cast some doubt on their claim. van Bommel (2011) studies the statistical properties of theWPC using simulated daily series.
He ﬁnds that theWPC is an inconsistent and biased estimator of price discoverywhen prices deviate from amartingale process due to
serial correlation. Likewise, Wang and Yang (2010) uses low-frequency data to show that theWPC approach deviates from the infor-
mation share approach of Hasbrouck (1995) in the presence of return serial correlation. At best, these studies stress the need to con-
trol for trading frictions when implementing the WPC approach.
In this paper, we propose a simple procedure to obtain friction-free WPC estimates using high (trade-by-trade) frequency data.
The procedure consists of three steps: ﬁrstly, we replace trade prices by quote midpoints to control for the bid-ask bounce; secondly,
we apply standard time series techniques to extract the friction-related dynamics in the quote-midpoint changes; thirdly, we use the
estimated friction-unrelated component of the quote-midpoint changes to obtain the friction-freeWPC estimate (WPC).5 Bymeans of
ourWPC estimates, we provide empirical evidence of the friction-related bias in the standardWPCwhen applied to high-frequency-
data.
We begin by reporting a signiﬁcant friction-driven downward bias in the standardWPC of small-size trades for themost liquid and
active stocks of the electronic order-driven platform of the Spanish Stock Exchange (SSE) between July 2000 and December 2006. Ig-
noring trading frictions, the dailyWPC ofmedium-size trades is 83%,while the dailyWPCof small-size trades is−1.6%. In contrast, the
WPCofmedium(small) size trades is 55.4% (37.1%). Next, we test if this friction-related downward bias for small-size trades increases
with the likelihood of information-motivated trading. Aswe restrict ourselves to dayswith open-to-close returns above 1%, the down-
ward bias of the small-size trades increases, from−38.7% to−72.71%. We show that negative WPCs for small size trades, which are
frequently taken as evidence of underperformance by retail traders, are rather due to trading frictions. We also document that this
friction-related bias can signiﬁcantly distort formal tests of the STH.
We provide some insights on the sources of the friction-relatedWPC bias. Firstly, we estimate that 85.6% of the daily WPC down-
ward bias for small-size trades is driven by the bid-ask bounce, but serial correlation signiﬁcantly adds to the bias. So, the friction-
related bias of the standard WPC cannot be fully corrected by simply replacing the trade price by the quote midpoint. Secondly,
trade aggressiveness helps to explain the bias. The downward bias of small-size trades only affects to non-aggressive trades
(−49.1%)\ the WPC of aggressive small-size trades is actually upward biased (11%).
We conduct a number of robustness tests.We start by showing that themagnitude of theWPC friction-related bias depends on the
time resolution of the analysis. In particular, the downward bias in the WPC of small size trades increases when computed over
monthly rather than daily intervals. Quite the opposite,WPCs computed at different frequencies and/orminimumdaily return cutoffs
converge. We also show that our results are not market-speciﬁc. For two representative samples of 1995 and 2005 NYSE-listed US
common stocks,we corroborate the downward bias in theWPC of small-size trades. Yet, the estimated bias for USmarkets is of small-
er magnitude than for the SSE. In days with positive returns and with consolidated (NYSE-NASDAQ-Paciﬁc/Arca) trades and quotes,
we document a−12.35% bias in 1995 and a−16.78% bias in 2005. The friction-related bias decreases when we use NYSE trades and
quotes only (−4.8% in 1995 and−12.83% in 2005).
Overall, we show that theWPC approach can be seriously biased by the presence of the friction-related component in the time se-
ries of the trade price change. In contrast, the WPC approach provides accurate and reliable estimates.
The rest of thepaper proceeds as follows. In Section 2,we summarize the stealth trading literature. In Section 3,we review theWPC
approach. In Section 4,we describe the SSE database. In Section 5,we presentWPCapproach. In Section 6,we report ourmainﬁndings.
In Section 7, we provide robustness tests. In Section 8, we conclude.2. Strategic fragmentation of orders
Studies about US markets during the 1980s and 1990s, spearheaded by BW93 seminal work, support the STH. With a sample of
tender-offer target ﬁrms, BW93ﬁnd that 99% of the cumulative price change during the pre-announcement period occurs onmedium
sizes. Chakravarty (2001) uses TORQ data to show that nearly 80% of the cumulative price change is due to medium-size trades by
institutional investors. Chakravarty, Chiyachantana, and Jiang (2008) report a disproportionately large WPC for mid-size trades in
the 2-day interval immediately after (before) positive (negative) earnings surprises in the 1990s. Furthermore, institutional trading
increases in the exact same intervals dominated by stealth traders.
More recently, price discovery in USmarkets has apparently shifted away frommedium sizes and into small sizes. Using NASDAQ
data, Choe and Hansch (2005) ﬁnd support to the STH from 1993 to 1998, but from 1999 to 2003 about 70–85% of the cumulative
price change is due to small trades. They attribute this reversal to microstructure changes.6 Chakravarty, Van Ness, and Van Ness
(2005) show that, after NYSE decimalization in 2001, the dollar adverse selection costs for medium-size trades decreased, which is
compatible with informed traders shifting to smaller sizes. Using 2005 data from NASDAQ, Blau, Van Ness, and Van Ness (2009b)
show that small short sales drive the short sales’ predictability of negative next-day returns. Finally, O’Hara, Yao, and Ye (2014)
use 2008–2009 NASDAQ data to show that more than 80% of the cumulative price change is accounted for trades of 100-shares or
less. They point to the raise of high frequency trading as the most likely explanation. The 2000s evidence for US markets suggests5 Here and in the rest of the text we use an overscore to indicate that a measure is friction-free.
6 Higher transparence, lower tick sizes, and enhanced competition have reduced transaction costs, most notably for small-size orders (e.g., Chung, Chuwonganant, &
McCormick, 2004; Smith, 1998).
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over time.7
All the studies above use BW93’s WPC approach described next.
3. The WPC approach
Suppose we have K size categories of trades and S stocks. For each stock s= {1,…, S} there areNs trades on a given time interval t.
The price contribution of the size category k for stock s on the interval t is given by7 The
(2011)
Stock Ex
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trading.PCsk;t ¼
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n¼1Δpnδn;kXNS
n¼1Δpn
; ð1Þwhere Δpn= pn− pn − 1 is the difference between the price of trade n and the price of trade n-1, and δn,k equals one if the n-th trade
belongs to the size category k and zero otherwise.
Let Δpts be the cumulative price change for stock s on interval t, the denominator of Eq. (1). The weighted cross-sectional average
price contribution for the size category k on the interval t is computed as8WPCk;t ¼
XS
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s
tPC
s
k;t ; ð2Þand the weights in Eq. (2) are given bywst ¼
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ð3ÞIn prior studies, Δpn in Eq. (1) is deﬁned either as the difference in prices (e.g., BW93) or as the log return (e.g., Chakravarty et al.,
2005), and the length of t varies from severalmonths (e.g., Ascioglu, Comerton-Forde, &McInish, 2011) to a few hours (e.g., Blau, Van
Ness, & Van Ness, 2009a). Some studies choose stocks withΔpts N 0 (e.g., Chakravarty, 2001), while some others ignore the sign ofΔpts
(e.g., O’Hara et al., 2014). Finally, overnight returns can be included (e.g., Chakravarty, 2001) or excluded (e.g., Choe & Hansch, 2005).
All studies, however, coincide in the way they deﬁne the price concession in Eq. (1), the WPC in Eq. (2), and the weights in Eq. (3).
BW93 propose two alternatives to the STH. The public information hypothesis (PIH) claims that price changes are entirely due to
public information. Accordingly, the price contribution in Eq. (1) for each trade size categorymust be proportional to its share on total
trades. The trading volume hypothesis (TVH) claims that large trades move prices more than small trades. Accordingly, the price con-
tribution in Eq. (1) for each trade-size category must be proportional to its share on total volume. BW93 propose testing the STH
against the PIH using the following pooled weighted-least-squares regressionPCsk;t ¼ αSDsS;t þ αMDsM;t þ αLDsL;t þ βPTsk;t þ εsk;t ; ð4Þwhere DS,ts , DM,ts and DL,ts are dummies that equal 1 when PCk,ts falls into the small-, medium- or large-size category, respectively. PTk,ts is
the proportion of trades in size category k for stock s on the interval t. To test the STH against the TVH,we replace PTk,ts in Eq. (4) by the
proportion of volume in size category k for stock s on the interval t (PVk,ts ). Regressionweights are given by Eq. (3). Under the PIH or the
TVH, the three α coefﬁcients in Eq. (4) must be zero and βmust be one.
4. The dataset
Weuse trade and quote data from the SSE.9 Our database has several advantages over themost accessible database for USmarkets,
the Monthly TAQ of the NYSE: all trades are reported, while the TAQ does not report odd lots (O’Hara et al., 2014); trades and best
quotes are alreadymatchedwithin the same ﬁle, while TAQ users face an imprecisematching because of the treatment of millisecond
time stamps (e.g., Holden& Jacobsen, 2014);we do not need of inaccurate trade classiﬁcation algorithms to determine the direction of
trades (e.g., Chakrabarty, Pascual, & Shkilko, 2014); we can accurately measure trade aggressiveness, and, ﬁnally, we avoid problemsre are a few studies about strategic fragmentation for non-USmarkets. Cai, Cai, and Keasey (2006)ﬁnd stealth trading in theChinese stockmarket. Ascioglu et al.
show that small-size trades in the Tokyo Stock Exchange rule price formation except in high volatility days. Kalev and Pham (2009) ﬁnd that in the Australian
change stealth trading happens when liquidity is low. Menkhoff and Schmeling (2010) provide evidence of stealth trading on a foreign exchange electronic
der market. Finally, Lin (2014) studies the relationship between transparency and the intensity of stealth trading practices on the Taiwan Stock Exchange.
ws that with greater pre-trade transparency, the WPC of small-size trades increased.
weighting mitigates potential biases resulting from large cumulative price changes of volatile ﬁrms.
010, theWorld Federation of Exchanges ranked the SSE as the 5th largest stock exchange in Europe bymarket capitalization, and the 4th by total value of share
229D. Abad, R. Pascual / International Review of Economics and Finance 37 (2015) 226–239that could arise with market fragmentation (e.g., Holden & Jacobsen, 2014) by using pre-MiFID (effective since November 1st, 2007)
data.10
We start with all the common stocks handled by the electronic order-driven platform of the SSE. Its continuous session spans from
9:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., preceded by a 30-minute opening call auction and followed by a 5-minute closing call auction. There are no
designated market makers. Limit orders are stored in an open limit order book following the usual price-time priority rule. Every
trade consumes liquidity either at the ask side or the bid side of the book. Price improvements are not possible.11
Our sample period extends from July 2000 to December 2006. During this period, the tick size was 0.01€, and there were no re-
markable microstructure changes in the SSE. From the whole population of SSE-listed stocks, we keep 55 that, during the 6½ years
considered, were IBEX-35 constituents for 1 year or more, never delisted from the electronic continuous platform, and traded for at
least 3 consecutive years.12
Our database contains trade and best-quote data. For each trade, we know the price, size, the prevailing best quotes and displayed
depth of the limit order book, and the time stamp (in seconds). While many trades may occur within the same second, the order of
execution is known because of an internal sequence indicator. Together with trades, the database contains changes in the best quotes
unrelated to trades. The quotes and depth prevailing right before and right after each trade are used to classify trades as aggressive or
non-aggressive. We exclude data from the opening and closing call auctions, and from intraday rule-based 5-minute volatility
auctions.13
In Table 1, we provide descriptive sample statistics. We form four equally-sized portfolios based on market capitalization, whose
composition is revised at the end of each year. The stocks in the upper quartile (“C1”) are muchmore active and liquid than the other
stocks in the sample.
5. Methodological details: the friction-free WPC
In our empirical application, we obtain daily WPCs for our sample of SSE-listed stocks.14 We deﬁne pn in Eqs. (2)-(3) as themar-
ginal price of trade n, that is, the price of the last share transferred with the nth trade. We control for outliers in PCk,ts in Eq. (1) by ap-
plying the rule of thumb (e.g., Hawkins, 1980) of dropping observations with a Z-score equal or larger than 3 in any trade-size
category.15 We use the same trade-size cutoffs than in previous studies: 500 and 10,000 shares. In the SSE, there are not round lots
as in US markets. Trades below 100 shares represent 14.75% of all trades in our sample.16
We obtain dailyWPC s as follows. Firstly, we use quote midpoints instead of prices to control for bid-ask bounce effects. Themid-
point change is Δqn = qn− qn − 1, where qn stands for the average of the inside quotes right after trade n.17 Notice that a bid-ask-
bounce-driven price change (Δpn≠ 0) results in a zero midpoint change (Δqn = 0). We assume that qn can be decomposed into
an efﬁcient price (mn) and a transitory component (sn): qn = mn + sn (e.g., Stoll, 2000). We deﬁne mn = E[ℑT|Φn] as the expected
true value of the asset at some distant future conditional on the public information available right after trade n. The unexpected com-
ponent of Δqn is Δmn = Δqn− E[Δsn|Φn − 1].
Secondly, we follow Hasbrouck (1991) in assuming that the relevant information in Φn − 1 is the history of mid-quote revisions
and trades up to trade n-1. The trading process is summarized by the trade sign (xn), which equals 1 for buyer-initiated trades
and−1 for seller-initiated trades; the signed trade size (vn) in shares, and the interaction of {xn, vn} with the prevailing bid-ask spread
(spn) and the trade duration (dn) – time in seconds between consecutive trades. The rational for including trade durations builds upon
Easley and O'Hara’s (1992)model, in which trades of any size executed at short durations, have a higher average price impact. Dufour
and Engle (2000) provide supporting evidence. The inclusion of the spread is justiﬁed by the adverse-selection costs literature.18 Em-
pirically, Hasbrouck (1991) ﬁnds that trades that occurwhen the spread iswide have a relatively higher price impact.We assume that
E[Δsn|Φn − 1] is a stable-over-time linear function of the history of trades and quotes,1910 Eve
has a 14
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ð5Þn nowadays, the fragmentation of the SSE is limited. In December 2013, the SSE accounts for 83.96% of the trading volume on SSE-listed stocks, whilst Bat-ChiX
.35% share and Turquoise a 1.59% share. Source: LiquidMetrix (http://www.if5.com/LiquidMetrix/Battlemap).
erg orders are allowed, but not fully hidden orders (see Pardo & Pascual, 2012).
IBEX-35 is the ofﬁcial index. Regularly revised every semester, extraordinary revisions are also common. Index constituents represent 90.2% of the trading vol-
the SSE within our sample period.
details on the short-lived rule-based trading halts of the SSE, see Abad and Pascual (2010).
he robustness section, we report results with a monthly resolution.
h a cutoff of 1.5, our results are the same.
have also considered stock-speciﬁc trade-size cutoffs derived from the empirical distribution of price changes of each particular stock in our sample. Our con-
do not vary.
also considered log prices and log quotes. Our ﬁndings and conclusions are the same.
Copeland and Galai (1983), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Glosten (1994), and Handa, Schwartz, and Tiwari (2003), among others.
anonymous referee proposes to include the limit order book (LOB) imbalance as an explanatory variable in Eq. (5). The LOB imbalance inﬂuences order choice
ais, Hillion, & Spatt, 1995; Ranaldo, 2004), and informs about posterior informational volatility (e.g., Foucault, Moinas, & Theissen, 2007; Pascual & Veredas,
sing complementary data on the ﬁve best ask and bid levels of the SSE LOB, we ﬁnd cross-sectional median correlations of roughly 0.99 between the stock-
esiduals of Eq. (5) with and without alternative LOB imbalance proxies. Our results would be unaltered by the inclusion of the LOB imbalance. Therefore, we
with the speciﬁcation shown in Eq. (5).
Table 1
Descriptive statistics.
This table contains descriptive statistics on our sample of 55 stocks traded in the SSE from July 2000 to December 2006. Stocks are split into 4 portfolios based on the
market capitalization at the beginning of each year. C1 are the largest stocks and C4 are the smallest stocks. In Panel A (B), we report the dailymean (median) and stan-
dard deviation (interquartile range) – in parenthesis, for each variable across stocks. “Trades” is the number of trades completed; “Volume” is the total amount
transacted inmillion Euros; “Trade size” is themedian trade size in shares; “price” is the average trade price; “Realized volatility” is the standard deviation of the 1-min-
ute trade price changes; “Relative spread” is the bid-ask spread divided by the quote midpoint multiplied by 100; “Depth” is the number of shares displayed at the best
ask and bid quotes in millions of Euros, and “Trade duration” is the time in seconds between consecutive trades.
Volume Trade size Realized Relative Depth Trade
Trades (millions €) (shares) Price volatility spread (millios €) duration
Panel A: Means and standard deviations
Sample 726.98 31.358 1982.98 19.00 0.0174 0.2529 0.2976 150.45
(1067.59) (79.81) (2584.40) (14.68) (0.011) (0.245) (1.60) (320.89)
C1 1630.00 96.375 3026.14 17.76 0.0167 0.1596 0.5026 122.61
(1615.14) (135.04) (3109.24) (9.21) (0.009) (0.185) (1.01) (437.69)
C2 503.02 12.413 1261.88 26.26 0.0158 0.1998 0.1989 98.75
(605.90) (15.83) (1154.25) (21.52) (0.009) (0.109) (1.32) (119.86)
C3 433.69 8.080 1355.70 20.03 0.0183 0.2950 0.1215 149.05
(456.60) (10.02) (1723.86) (13.04) (0.011) (0.331) (0.68) (322.96)
C4 283.24 4.282 2230.42 12.30 0.0193 0.3694 0.3644 237.10
(327.14) (5.93) (3257.92) (9.29) (0.013) (0.246) (2.69) (296.47)
Panel B: Medians and interquartile ranges
Sample 408 7.130 1247.40 15.02 0.0147 0.1830 0.0740 74.67
(508) (15.97) (1416.36) (13.49) (0.011) (0.183) (0.095) (89.53)
C1 1123 42.332 2122.05 14.93 0.0147 0.1127 0.1633 27.15
(1698) (111.85) (2872.70) (9.43) (0.010) (0.073) (0.258) (39.08)
C2 411 8.376 996.84 19.54 0.0135 0.1705 0.0745 74.04
(348) (10.72) (1044.97) (23.58) (0.009) (0.124) (0.066) (61.71)
C3 350 5.338 943.55 16.28 0.0154 0.2194 0.0554 86.84
(305) (7.31) (956.83) (16.67) (0.012) (0.196) (0.059) (76.09)
C4 224 2.548 1293.65 10.53 0.0156 0.2981 0.0479 135.72
(264) (4.04) (1347.93) (9.93) (0.014) (0.255) (0.052) (193.08)
230 D. Abad, R. Pascual / International Review of Economics and Finance 37 (2015) 226–239For each stock-month,we estimate Eq. (5) by OLSwithWhite-robust standard errors.Wediscard the ﬁrst r trades each day, so that
no lag reaches back to the previous day.We consider different options for r, from 5 to 15 lags. Our conclusions are robust to the choice
of r, but the average ﬁrst order autocorrelation of Δmn decreases up to r = 10. So, we report ﬁndings exclusively for r = 10. The
average Durbin Watson statistic for Δmn across stock-monthly estimates is 1.99 (std. 0.0217).
We compute the WPC of a given trade-size category using of Eqs. (1) to (3), but replacing Δpn by the estimated Δmn.
6. Empirical ﬁndings
6.1. The friction-related bias
In Table 2, we present the average WPC in Eq. (2) and its friction-free version (WPC), computed using the time series of Δmn in
Eq. (5). We also report the weighted average daily proportion of trades (%T) and volume (%V) using the weights in Eq. (3).
According to the WPC, medium-size trades account for more than 83% of the price discovery in the SSE between 2000 and 2006,
overcoming their %T (about 39%) and %V (about 61%). Large-size trades’ contribution is about 18.5%, largely above their %T (2.2%) but
below its %V (23.4%). In contrast, theWPC of small-size trades is negative (−1.6%), far below their %T (58.7%) and %V (15.7%). Overall,
the SSE displays similar stealth trading patterns than the US markets during the 1980s and 1990s.Table 2
WPC friction-related bias
This table reports the daily averageweightedprice contribution (WPC), the daily average friction-freeweightedprice contribution (WPC), the proportion of trades (%T),
and the proportion of volume in shares (%V) for small-, medium-, and large-size trades in our sample. WPC is computed using trade price changes (Δp), whileWPC is
computed using the unexpected quote midpoint changes (Δm), estimated by the residuals of the time series model in Eq. (5), with r = 10. We consider BW93 trade-
size classiﬁcation: (0 499] small-sized, [500 9,999) medium-size, [10,000 ∞) large-sized. R is the daily (open-to-close) log return.
Sample Size category WPC WPC %T %V
All days (0 499] −1.63 37.09 58.71 15.74
[500 9,999] 83.17 55.43 39.11 61.02
[10,000 ∞) 18.46 7.48 2.19 23.24
R N1% (0 499] −39.79 32.92 57.29 14.20
[500 9,999] 113.88 57.10 40.32 60.85
[10,000 ∞) 25.91 9.98 2.39 24.95
231D. Abad, R. Pascual / International Review of Economics and Finance 37 (2015) 226–239TheWPCapproach shows amarkedly different scenario.Whilemedium-size trades account for amoremodest 55.4% of the cumu-
lative price change, the WPC of small-size trades achieves a remarkable 37.1%. In other words, we report a 38.71% friction-related
downward bias in the daily WPC of SSE small-size trades between 2000 and 2006. While still below their %T, the WPC of small-size
trades is more than twice their %V.
Chakravarty (2001) argues that, because of short-selling restrictions, informed sales in declining stocks are less likely than in-
formed purchases in rising stocks. Hence, the chances of detecting stealth trading should increase if we pick days that display a sig-
niﬁcant price increase. In Table 2, we provide separated results for days with open-to-close log returns (R) N1%. With this subset of
days, the friction-related downward bias in the WPC of small-size trades increases to−72.7%. The friction-related bias in WPC is
therefore more prominent in periods of signiﬁcant price discovery, precisely when information-motivated trading is more likely.
Table 2 reports negativeWPC for small-size trades, a frequent ﬁnding in the literature.20 Some studies (e.g., Choe & Hansch, 2005)
associate negativeWPCswith underperformance by retail traders (e.g., Barber & Odean, 2000). Noticeably, our ﬁndings attribute neg-
ativeWPCs to noise in the time series of price changes. By construction, only trades that generate non-zeroΔpn contribute to theWPC.
A negative WPC therefore implies that trades are pushing prices systematically in the “wrong” direction. We label a trade as being
“wrong” if it causes a positive (negative) price change whilst the daily cumulative price change is negative (positive). Under the
performance-based explanation, we should expect the initiators of small-size trades to be systematically wrong. In our sample,
there are 11,337,755 wrong trades, representing 21.5% of all trades. Nearly 46% of them are small-sized and 47% are medium-sized.
Moreover, 22.1% of the small-sized trades are wrong, rather close to the 21.2% (19.8%) of medium- (large-) size trades. It seems un-
likely that these tiny differences could explain neither the negativeWPC of small-size trades, nor the huge gap inWPC found between
small- andmedium-size trades. We therefore conclude that our results do not support a performance-based explanation for negative
WPCs.
We follow a pooled regression approach to provide evidence on the statistical signiﬁcance of the friction-related bias inWPC. The
magnitude of the bias for a particular stock i, at day d, and trade-size category s is computed asBiasids ¼ PCids−PCids, where PCids is the
price contribution in Eq. (1), andPCids is its friction-free version, obtained usingΔmt and Eq. (5).We study both the direction (signed)
bias and the magnitude (absolute) bias. Our stock-daily pooled regression model is of the following form:20 See
Table 1)
21 Tho
ters byBiasids ¼ α þ β1Mids þ β2Lids þ β3LCapsids þ εids; ð6ÞwhereMids (Lids) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the trade-size category ismedium (large). Thus, the intercept captures the effect
of the omitted category: small-size trades. As control variable we include the dummy LCapids that equals 1 if stock i’s market capital-
ization at the beginning of the corresponding year is above the upper quartile across stocks.We estimate Eq. (6) by weighted LS with
Thompson (2011) double clustered standard errors.21Weights are given by Eq. (3).We consider days with R N 1% only.We report the
estimated coefﬁcients in Table 3, with Thompson (2011) standard errors in parenthesis.
The intercept of the (signed) bias regression,which captures the average daily bias for small-size trades, is signiﬁcantly negative at
the 1% level. Hence, we conﬁrm the statistical signiﬁcance of the downward bias of small size trades reported in Table 2. The coefﬁ-
cients forMids and Lids are positive and larger than the intercept, conﬁrming the upward-bias in the contributions of medium- and
large-size trades. According to the absolute bias regression, the daily average magnitude of the bias is larger for small-size trades
than for the other trade-size categories.
Howmuch of the friction-related bias inWPC is due to bid-ask bounce?We address this question by estimating the cross-sectional
averageWPCk,t in Eq. (2) using quotemidpoint changes (Δqn) instead of trade price changes (Δpn). Computed in thismanner, theWPC
accounts for bid-ask bounce, but ignores serial correlation in Δqn. Table 4 reports the resulting decomposition.
The bid-ask bounce effect explains 85.3% of the bias across trade-size categories (89.6% for days with open-to-close returns N1%).
Hence, replacing trade prices by quote midpoints in any empirical analysis should correct most of the bias, but still,WPCwill provide
more accurate estimates since transitory dynamics in Δqn markedly add to the bias.
Overall, theWPC approach provides empirical support to the simulation-based conclusion of van Bommel (2011), but using high
frequency data: trading frictions can severely bias the WPC approach.
6.2. Trade aggressiveness and the WPC friction-related bias
Size-based classiﬁcations of trades, like those employed in stealth trading analyses, ignore order aggressiveness. Aggressive buy
(sell) orders walk up (down) the book. Non-aggressive trades do not consume all the depth available at the best opposite quote. Con-
sequently, aggressive trades of any given size carry on higher price concessions than non-aggressive trades of similar size. For exam-
ple, suppose that the best and second best ask quotes are €23.45 and €23.47, respectively, and the best bid quote is €23.43; the
available depth at each quote is 1,000 shares, and the previous trade (n-1) was a buy at the current best ask quote. The marginal
price pn of a medium-size market buy order of 1,100 shares would be €23.47, implying Δpn = €0.02 and Δqn = €0.01. In contrast,
for a medium-size market buy order of 999 shares, Δpn = Δqn = €0. Consequently, the ex-post aggressive trade contributes to theBarclay andWarner (1993), Table 1), Chakravarty (2001), Table 1), Choe andHansch (2005), Table 1), Chakravarty et al. (2008), Table 3), Ascioglu et al. (2011),
.
mpson (2011) standard errors cluster for both stock and time. The covariance estimator equals the estimator that clusters by stock plus the estimator that clus-
time minus the usual White (1980) robust estimator.
Table 3
Friction-related bias: Regression analysis.
This table reports the estimated coefﬁcients of pooled weighted least square regressions with Thompson (2011) standard errors (in parenthesis) that cluster by both
ﬁrm and time (day).We use two alternative dependent variables: (a) the friction-related bias in the daily price contribution (PC), and (b) the absolute value of that bias.
We use three trade-size categories: (0 499] small-sized, [500 9,999] medium-sized, and [10,000 ∞) large-sized. For stock (i), day (d), and trade size category (s), we
compute PCids as the sum of the trade price changes divided by the daily cumulative price change. The friction-related bias is the difference between PCids and the fric-
tion-free PCids. The latter is obtained using the unexpected quotemidpoint changes given by the residuals of the time seriesmodel in Eq. (5) (r = 10).We only consider
days with open-to-close returns larger than 1%. Weights are given by Eq. (3). The regression variablesM and L are dummies for medium-sized and large-sized trades,
respectively. The omitted category is small-size trades. The dummy LCaps equals 1when the observation corresponds to a large cap in our sample. Large caps are deﬁned
as the stocks in the upper quartile in terms of yearly average market capitalization. Large caps constituents are revised yearly.
Coeff. Bias |Bias|
M 0.0934** −0.0254**
(6.57) (−6.50)
L 0.0660** −0.1005**
(5.77) (−16.12)
LCaps 0.0003 0.0487**
(0.25) 3.198
Intercept −0.0518** 0.1319**
(−6.52) (12.65)
Obs. 85740
Adj. R2 0.045 0.086
* (**) means stistically signiﬁcant at the 0.05 (0.01).
Table 4
Sources of bias: bid-ask bounce vs. serial correlation.
This table decomposes theWPC friction-related bias into two orthogonal components: a bid-ask bounce driven component and a bid-ask-bounce-free serial correlation
driven component. We use BW93’s trade-size classiﬁcation: (0 499] small-sized, [500 9,999] medium-size, [10,000 ∞) large-sized. R is the daily (open-to-close) log
return.
Days Bias decomposition
Trade-size category Bias Bid-ask
bounce
Serial
correlation
All (0 499] −38.71 0.856 0.144
[500 9999] 27.73 0.862 0.138
[10000 ∞) 10.98 0.842 0.158
mean 0.853 0.147
R N 1% (0 499] −72.71 0.892 0.108
[500 9999] 56.78 0.888 0.112
[10000 ∞) 15.93 0.908 0.092
mean 0.896 0.104
232 D. Abad, R. Pascual / International Review of Economics and Finance 37 (2015) 226–239WPC, whereas the ex-post non-aggressive trade does not. This simple example illustrates why, in order-driven markets, the relative
(to the available depth) trade size matters in computing the WPC.
Continuing with the above example, we illustrate now that, for any given trade size category, non-aggressive trades are more
likely to lead to pure noise-related contributions than similar aggressive trades. Let trade n-1 be now a sell at the current bid
quote (pn-1 = €23.43) rather than a buy. In this case, the 1,100- and 999-share trades both contribute to the WPC: Δpn = €0.04
and €0.02, respectively. Whilst the aggressive trade contribution is partly informative (Δqn = €0.01), the non-aggressive trade con-
tribution is pure noise (Δqn = €0).
In this section, we question if trade aggressiveness can explain, at least in part, the downward friction-related bias in the WPC of
small-size trades. In Table 5 - Panel A, we provide statistics on trade aggressiveness. In our sample, non-aggressive trades outnumber
aggressive trades by more than 3.5 to 1. Notably, non-aggressive trades are far more common among small-size trades (82.8%) than
among any other trade size category.
In Table 5 - Panel B, we use pooled regressions to study the distinct role that aggressive and non-aggressive trades play on theWPC
statistic. For each stock i, day d, and trade-size category s, we compute the proportion of both aggressive and non-aggressive trades
that: (a) contribute to the WPC (Δpn≠ 0); (b) contribute but with a noise-driven price change (Δpn≠ 0 and Δqn = 0); (c) are
wrong, and (d) satisfy both (b) and (c).22 Our pooled regression model is22 Wroyidsa ¼ α þ β1Midsa þ β2Lidsa þ β3ASidsa þ β4AMidsa þ β5ALidsa þ β6LCapsidsa þ εidsa ð7Þwhere sub-index a represents the aggressiveness category (i.e., aggressive v. non-aggressive). The dependent variable y is one of the
(a) to (d) daily proportions deﬁned above;M, L, AS, AM, and AL are all dummy variables:M (L) equals 1 if trades aremedium- (large-)ng trades are deﬁned as in the prior subsections.
Table 5
Trade aggressiveness and trading frictions.
In Panel A, we provide general statistics about the distribution of aggressive and non-aggressive trades among trade-size categories. An aggressive trade walks up or
down the book. A non-aggressive trade does not consume all the available depth at the opposite side of the market. In Panel B, we report pooled regression in
Eq. (7) on the stock-daily-trade-size proportion of aggressive and non-aggressive trades that: [a] contribute to the WPC; [b] contribute to the WPC but with bid-ask
bounce driven price change; [c] are wrong trades, and [d] are wrong trades that contribute with a bid-ask bounce driven price change. A trade is wrong if it causes a
positive (negative) price change whilst the daily cumulative price change, the denominator in Eq. (1), is negative (positive). Thompson (2011) standard errors are re-
ported in parenthesis. We use BW93’s trade-size classiﬁcation: (0 499] small-sized, [500 9,999] medium-size, [10,000 ∞) large-sized. The regression variablesM and L
are dummies for medium-size and large-size non-aggressive trades, respectively. AS, AM and AL are dummies for small-size, medium-size and large-size aggressive
trades, respectively. The omitted category is small-size non-aggressive trades. The dummy LCaps equals 1 when the observation corresponds to a large cap in our sam-
ple. Large caps are deﬁned as the stocks in the upper quartile in terms of yearly average market capitalization. Large caps constituents are revised yearly.
Panel A: Statistics on aggressiveness
Small Medium Large Total
Aggr. 3,347,577 6,953,005 1,299,606 11,600,188
17.20% 35.03% 56.83%
Non-aggr. 20,289,541 18,234,297 2,581,269 41,105,107
82.80% 64.97% 43.17%
Panel B: Pooled regressions
Coeff. [a] [b] [c] [d]
Contrib.
to WPC
Bid-ask
bounce
driven
Wrong
trades
Wrong+
bid-ask
bounce driv.
M −0.0296** −0.0091* −0.0128** −0.0126
(−7.94) (−2.58) (−13.96) (−6.58)
L 0.0078 0.0494** −0.0244** 0.0052
(1.11) (6.51) (−11.21) (1.25)
AS 0.0393** −0.2472** 0.1320** −0.1298
(3.48) (−27.06) (42.40) (−24.37)
AM 0.1276** −0.2319** 0.1559** −0.1224
(9.03) (−22.52) (46.50) (−20.67)
AL 0.2942** −0.1057** 0.1615** −0.0555
(14.08) (−4.82) (29.68) (−4.56)
LCaps −0.0536* −0.0063* −0.0184 −0.0035
(−2.55) (−2.08) (−1.95) (−2.06)
Intercept 0.4558** 0.2907** 0.0832** 0.1528
(51.30) (35.25) (17.44) (30.71)
Obs. 389117
Adj. R2 0.239 0.337 0.238 0.175
** (*) means statitsically signﬁicant at the 1% (5%) level.
233D. Abad, R. Pascual / International Review of Economics and Finance 37 (2015) 226–239sized and non-aggressive; AS, AM and AL equal 1 if trades are aggressive and small-sized, medium-sized, and large-sized, respectively.
Thus, the omitted category is small-size non-aggressive trades. We use the same control variable as in Eq. (6). Eq. (7) is estimated by
weighted LS with Thompson (2011) standard errors.Table 6
Trade aggressiveness and the WPC bias.
This table reports the daily average weighted price contribution (WPC), the daily average friction-free weighted price contribution (WPC), the friction related bias in
WPC, theproportion of trades (%T), and theproportion of volume in shares (%V) for small-,medium-, and large-size aggressive andnon-aggressive trades in our sample.
A trade is aggressive if it consumes at least the available depth (both displayed and non-displayed) at the best quote on the opposite side of the market. We consider
BW93’s trade-size classiﬁcation: (0 499] small-sized, [500 9,999] medium-sized, [10,000 ∞) large-sized. R is the daily (open-to-close) log return.
Sample Size category Aggr. WPC WPC Bias %T %V
All days (0 499] No −27.72 21.37 −49.09 44.95 10.57
Yes 26.92 15.86 11.05 11.07 3.69
[500 9,999] No 21.09 11.98 9.11 26.89 31.82
Yes 61.68 43.27 18.42 13.96 26.76
[10,000 ∞) No 6.29 1.13 5.16 1.88 11.02
Yes 11.73 6.39 5.35 1.24 16.15
R N 1% (0 499] No −57.85 12.58 −70.43 45.09 10.55
Yes 32.08 22.70 9.38 11.86 4.12
[500 9,999] No 36.48 5.70 30.77 25.55 31.06
Yes 69.03 50.55 18.48 14.38 27.52
[10,000 ∞) No 7.19 0.64 6.55 1.81 10.41
Yes 13.08 7.82 5.26 1.32 16.33
Table 7
Friction-related bias: regression analysis.
This table reports the estimated coefﬁcients of pooled weighted least square regressions with Thompson (2011) standard errors (in parenthesis). We use two alterna-
tive dependent variables: (a) the friction related bias in the daily price contribution (PC), and (b) the absolute value of that bias. We use three trade-size categories: (0
499] small-sized, [500 9,999]medium-sized, and [10,000∞) large-sized.We also separate aggressive fromnon-aggressive trades in each trade-size category. An aggres-
sive trade consumes at least the available depth (both displayed and non-displayed) at the best quote on the opposite side of the market. For each resulting trade size-
aggressiveness (sa) category, for each stock i, and each day d, we compute PCidsa as the sum of the trade price changes divided by the daily cumulative price change. The
friction related bias is the difference between PCidsa and the friction-free PCidsa. The latter is obtained using the unexpected quote midpoint changes given by the resid-
uals of the time seriesmodel in Eq. (5) (r = 10).Weonly consider dayswith open-to-close returns larger than 1%.Weights are given by Eq. (3). The regression variables
AS,M, AM, L, AL are dummies for the following categories of trades: small-sized and aggressive,medium-sized and non-aggressive,medium-sized and aggressive, large-
sized and non-aggressive, and large-sized and aggressive, respectively. The omitted category is small-size non-aggressive trades. LCaps equals 1 when the observation
corresponds to a large cap in our sample. Large caps are deﬁned as the stocks in the upper quartile in terms of yearly average market capitalization. Large caps constit-
uents are revised yearly.
Coeff. Bias |Bias|
AS 0.1323** −0.1199**
(4.44) (−7.09)
M 0.1534** −0.0887**
(4.99) (−8.47)
AM 0.1663** −0.0826**
(4.49) (−6.678)
L 0.1333** −0.1645**
(5.08) (−13.82)
AL 0.1317** −0.1569**
(4.66) (−12.59)
LCaps 0.0004 0.0509**
(0.35) (3.21)
Intercept −0.1180** 0.1750**
(−4.82) (13.73)
Obs. 85740
Adj. R2 0.089 0.173
*(*) means stistically signiﬁcant at the 0.05 (0.01).
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ery. Always in relative terms to the total number of trades in each trade-size/aggressiveness category, non-aggressive trades of all
sizes contribute less often to theWPC than aggressive trades (2nd column), but aremore often associatedwith bid-ask bounce driven
price changes (3rd column). Initiators of aggressive trades aremore oftenwrong (4th column) than initiators of non-aggressive trades
but, even then, price changes are less likely due to bid-ask bounce (5th column). Finally, all the estimated models suggest that non-
aggressive small-size trades tend to add noise to the WPC more often than non-aggressive medium-size trades.
We postulate that the prevalence of non-aggressive trades among small-size trades (Table 5 – Panel A) together with the higher
propensity of non-aggressive trades to cause noise-driven price changes (Table 5 – Panel B) could partially explain the downward
friction-related bias in theWPC of small-size trades. In Table 6, we report theWPC andWPC of our six trade-size/aggressiveness cat-
egories. We report results for all days and days with R N 1%.
We ﬁnd that the friction-related downward bias in theWPC of small-size trades concentrates on non-aggressive trades. TheWPC
of aggressive small-size trades is, in effect, upward biased. In dayswith R N 1%, the downward bias of small-size non-aggressive trades
rises to−70.4%, whilst non-aggressive medium-size trades experience the highest upward bias. In days with R N 1%, small- and
medium-size aggressive trades displayWPCs of 22.7% and 50.55%, respectively, more than proportional to their %T and %V. Markedly,
the WPC of non-aggressive medium-size trades reveals that these trades do not use to conceal informed traders.
We use the pooled regression model in Eq. (7) to test the statistical signiﬁcance of the friction-related bias in theWPC. As depen-
dent variable (y), we use now either the signed bias (Biasidsa ¼ PCidsa−PCidsa) or the absolute bias per trade-size/aggressiveness
category. We report the weighted LS estimates with Thompson (2011) standard errors in Table 7.
The intercept of the (signed) bias regression is signiﬁcantly negative at the 1% level, whilst the coefﬁcient for the other categories is
positive and larger than the intercept. Therefore, we conﬁrm a statistically signiﬁcant downward bias in the WPC of small-size non-
aggressive trades. Medium-size aggressive and non-aggressive trades report the highest signiﬁcant upward biases. The |bias| regres-
sion conﬁrms that the averagemagnitude of the bias ismuch larger for small-size non-aggressive trades than for the other categories.
6.3. Trading frictions and formal tests of the STH
Next, we use the WPC approach to provide evidence on the robustness of the BW93’s methodology to test the STH. In
Table 8 – Panel A, we report the estimated pooled weighted LS regression in Eq. (4) using either PCids or PCids as the explan-
atory variable.23 We focus on stock-days with R N 1% to increase the likelihood of detecting stealth trading.
The public information (PIH) and the trading volume (TVH) hypotheses are rejected across the board. The nulls that the coefﬁcient
of PT or PV equals one and that all dummy variables have zero coefﬁcients are rejected at the 1% level. Ignoring trading frictions, our23 As in previous regressions, we compute Thompson (2011) double clustered standard errors for the coefﬁcient estimates. We omit them in this and posterior
Tables for space limitations.
Table 8
The friction-related bias and formal tests of the STH.
In Panel A, we report the estimated pooled weighted least square regression in Eq. (4) with Thompson (2011) standard errors (omitted). The dependent variable is
either the price contribution (PC) or the friction-free price contribution (PC) of the trade size category k, for stock s, and day d.We consider three trade size categories:
(0 499] small-sized, [500 9,999]medium-size, [10,000∞) large-sized. Theweights are given by Eq. (3). PIH stands for public information hypothesis and TVH for trading
volume hypothesis. Under the PIH (TVH), the null hypothesis is that the three trade-size coefﬁcients equal zero and the PT (PV) coefﬁcient equals one. Wald tests are
provided. R is the daily cumulative price change. In Panel B,we expand Eq. (4) to consider six trade-size categories: aggressive and non-aggressive small-, medium-, and
large-size trades. We focus on stock-days with open-to-close returns (R) N 1%.
Coeff. PC – R N 1% PC – R N 1%
PIH TVH PIH TVH
Panel A: Ignoring trade aggressiveness
S −1.287** −0.522** −0.069** 0.273**
M 0.452** 0.242** 0.286** 0.277**
L 0.178** −0.118** 0.064** −0.051**
PT 1.656†† 0.719††
PV 1.395†† 0.501††
Adj. R2 0.189 0.189 0.237 0.232
Obs. 44059 44059 43623 43623
Panel B: Controlling for trade aggressiveness
S non-aggr. −0.861** −0.760** −0.169** 0.073**
aggr. 0.243* 0.252** 0.147** 0.208**
M non-aggr. 0.250* −0.028 −0.101** −0.074
aggr. 0.639** 0.302** 0.417** 0.386**
L non-aggr. 0.072** −0.024** −0.005 −0.037**
aggr. 0.131** −0.084** 0.072** 0.005
PT 0.539†† 0.639††
PV 1.353†† 0.438††
Adj. R2 0.134 0.149 0.117 0.115
Obs. 88132 88132 87249 87249
*, ** means statistically different from zero at the 5% (1%) level.
† (††) means statistically different from one at the 5% (1%) level (Wald test).
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covery (αS b 0).Without trading frictions, however,αS becomes positive and signiﬁcant in the TVH regression. In fact, the nullαS=αM
cannot be rejected at the 1% level.
In Panel B of Table 8, we extend Eq. (4) to control for trade aggressiveness. Ignoring trading frictions, our regressions do reveal the
signiﬁcant role that small-size aggressive trades play in price discovery. However, the PIH regression assigns a comparable role to
medium-size non-aggressive trades, which contradicts the WPC results in Table 6. Once we ﬁlter the price changes for trading fric-
tions, our results in all regressions reveal disproportional contributions for only small- and medium-size aggressive trades.
Overall, our results cast some doubts on the robustness of the formal tests of the STH to trading frictions.
7. Robustness
7.1. Monthly WPC
Do our results depend on the time resolution of the WPC analysis? In Table 9, we present the average WPC across stocks and
months, together with the estimated friction-related bias in WPC, and the weighted average daily proportion of trades (%T) and vol-
ume (%V).We focus onmonthly observationswith R N 2.5% to increase the likelihood of observing stealth trading.We also control for
trade aggressiveness.
We ﬁnd that the magnitude of the friction-related bias depends on the time resolution. Namely, the bias increases with time
aggregation. As in the daily analysis, small-size aggressive trades’ WPC is downward biased, whilst medium-size trades’ WPC
experiences the highest upward bias. Once we control for trading frictions, however, the resulting WPCs are close to those in
Table 6. Hence, the WPC approach provides not only more accurate estimates than the WPC approach, but also more robust
and reliable.
7.2. US markets
Is the friction-related bias of theWPC amarket-speciﬁc phenomenon? In this section,we test if it extends to USmarkets, where the
stealth trading research has been more active.
Our US data analysis suffers from limitations inherent to the database we employ, the Monthly TAQ of the NYSE: (i) The TAQ da-
tabase does not report odd lots. O’Hara et al. (2014) show that small-size odd lots remarkably contribute to price discovery. (ii) We
cannot measure trade aggressiveness because the TAQ does not provide order-level data (e.g., Bacidore, Ross, & Soﬁanos, 2003).
Table 9
Monthly WPC.
For small-,medium-, and large-size aggressive and non-aggressive trades in our sample, this table reports themonthly averageweighted price contribution (WPC); the
monthly average friction-freeweighted price contribution (WPC); the friction related bias inWPC, the proportion of trades (%T), and the proportion of volume in shares
(%V). A trade is aggressive if it consumes at least the available depth (both displayed and non-displayed) at the best quote on the opposite side of themarket. We con-
sider BW93’s trade-size classiﬁcation: (0 499] small-sized, [500 9,999]medium-sized, [10,000∞) large-sized. R is the daily (open-to-close) log return.We report trades
for stock-months with R N 2.5% to increase the likelihood of observing stealth trading.
Sample Trade size
category
Aggr. WPC Bias %T %V
R N2.5% (0 499] No 30.03 −358.55 43.69 7.84
Yes 12.27 79.67 10.16 2.87
[500 9,999] No 15.76 99.48 27.98 30.03
Yes 35.23 137.31 13.98 24.38
[10,000 ∞) No 1.71 20.96 2.59 14.71
Yes 5.00 21.13 1.61 20.17
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is particularly problematic in modern high frequency markets.24 For all these reasons, our ﬁndings must be carefully interpreted.
We avoid dealing with high frequency markets using 1995 and 2005 data (whole years). By choosing these particular periods, we
are also able to test if the friction-related bias inWPC is independent of the lower bound of trade size for stealth trading (e.g., Choe &
Hansch, 2005).
We form a representative sample of common stocks by market capitalization as follows. We start with the CRSP universe of com-
mon stocks (SHRCLS=. or A) and restrict it to NYSE-listed stocks (PRIMEXCH= N). We eliminate stocks with SIC code greater than
9000 (Government owned), between 8880 and 8888 (ADRs and foreign Governments), and between 4800 and 4999 (regulated util-
ities). We also drop stocks from non-US companies, with security status other than “regular” (SECSTAT≠ R), with dual shares, with
trade prices below $2 or above $200, or with no daily price or volume records.
We rank and divide the remaining assets in four groups by daily average market capitalization. We discard those in the bottom
quartile (smallest stocks). For each of the top three groups, we retain the 200 largest stocks, sort them by ticker symbol, and then
pick every 4th stock. This procedure results in 150 randomly selected stocks (50 for each size group)with a signiﬁcant size difference
between groups.
We use trades and quotes during regular market hours. We clean the trade and quote ﬁles with the ﬁlters in Hendershott and
Moulton (2011, p. 578) and Chakrabarty and Moulton (2012, p. 14). To avoid problems of stale quotes, we construct two BBO series
for each stock, one from NYSE quotes only (NYSE BBO) and the other with quotes from NYSE, Paciﬁc Exchange/Arca and NASDAQ
(NBBO).25
Regarding the alignment of trades and quotes, wemake no allowance of trade reporting lags.26 NYSE BBO quotes are aligned with
NYSE trades only. The BBO constructed from theN/P/T/Q quotes is alignedwith trades originating from those exchanges.We use three
alternative trade classiﬁcation algorithms: the tick rule, Lee and Ready (1991), and Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara (2000).27 Overall, our
ﬁndings are robust to the classiﬁcation rule.
In Table 10, we provide theWPC for our sample of 1995 (Panel A) and 2005 (Panel B)NYSE-listed stocks. Using theNBBO, the 1995
WPC of small-size trades is 11.54%,whilst in 2005 raises to 60.23%.28UsingNYSE data only, the 1995WPCof small-size trades is higher
(19.18%) but only slightly lower in 2005 (57.65%). In days with strictly positive open-to-close returns, the 2005 WPC of small-size
trades falls to 48.53%with NBBO and 36%with NYSE BBO. Overall, results in Table 10 illustrate the increasing role of small-size trades
in price discovery previously reported for US stock exchanges.
In Table 10, we also report the estimated friction-related bias (WPC−WPC) using Lee and Ready (1991) as trade classiﬁcation rule.
As in the SSE case, the overall WPC of small-size trades is downward biased both in 1995 and 2005, but the magnitude of the bias
is smaller in US markets. The WPC bias is larger with consolidated (N/P/T/Q) trades and quotes (1995: −12.35% to −18.51%;
2005:−11.08% to−16.78%) thanwith just NYSE trades and quotes (1995:−4.8% to−5.38%; 2005:−7.77% to−12.83%). Markedly,
the friction-related bias has not vanished with the fall in the trade size lower bound for stealth trading during the 2000s.
As in the SSE case, we test the statistical signiﬁcance of the bias for each trade-size category using Eq. (6).We report the estimated
α, β1, and β2 coefﬁcients in Table 10. We ﬁnd positive and statistically signiﬁcant (at the 1% level) β1 and β2 coefﬁcients across the24 Holden and Jacobsen (2014) show that the proliferation of ﬂeeting orders and the TAQ treatment of millisecond time stamps cause signiﬁcant distortions inmeth-
odologies that rely in the alignment of trades and quotes. Trade classiﬁcation algorithms are a notorious example (e.g., Odders-White, 2000). Recently, Easley, López de
Prado, and O’Hara (2013) argue that the growing speed, volume and fragmentation of current US markets pose serious challenges to traditional classiﬁcation
algorithms.
25 We discard data from other exchanges. They represent 4.4% of all trades in 2005 and 22% in 1995.
26 We obtain similar results with a 1-second trade reporting lag. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the rule was to allow for a 5-second trade reporting lag (e.g., Lee &
Ready, 1991). Using 1998 data, Bessembinder (2003) concludes the 5-second rule is no longer necessary. Since then, the common practice is the one we follow
(e.g., Hendershott & Moulton, 2011).
27 Odders-White (2000), Chakrabarty, Li, Nguyen, and Van Ness (2007), Easley et al. (2013), and Chakrabarty et al. (2014) offer reviews of trade classiﬁcation
algorithms.
28 For NASDAQ-listed stocks, O’Hara et al. (2014) report a 60.9% WPC for 2008–2010 trades with size [100, 500) (Table 6, Panel B), whilst Choe and Hansch (2005)
report a 77.5% WPC for 2000–2003 trades and a−1% WPC for 1993–1996 trades with size [100, 500) (Table 1).
Table 10
US markets.
In this table, we provide theweightedprice contribution (WPC) analysis for two samples of 150US common stocks listed in theNYSE in1995 (Panel A) and 2005 (Panel
B), respectively. We use data from the NYSE Monthly TAQ. We consider BW93’s trade-size classiﬁcation: (0–499] small-sized, [500–9,999] medium-sized, [10,000 ∞)
large-sized. For each category, we report the friction-related bias inWPC, the proportion of trades (%T), and the proportion of volume in shares (%V). The bias is com-
puted as the difference between theWPC computed using trade-price changes and the friction-freeWPC, computed using friction-unrelated changes in the quotemid-
point. We report results for two different subsets of trades and quotes: ‘N/P/T/Q NBBO’means consolidated data from the NYSE, Paciﬁc Exchange/Arca and NASDAQ;
‘NYSE BBO’means NYSE data only. Finally, we report the estimatedα (small-size trades), β1 (medium-size trades) and β2 (large-size trades) coefﬁcients of the Eq. (8).
Sample Size category N/P/T/Q NBBO NYSE BBO
WPC Bias‡ Coef. %T %V NYSE Bias‡ Coef. %T %V
Panel A: 1995 data
All days (0 499] 11.54 −18.51 −0.351 ** 43.43 7.16 19.18 −5.38 −0.069 * 38.10 6.21
[500 9,999] 70.16 13.71 0.295 ** 51.81 55.98 63.40 5.11 0.078 ** 56.05 56.07
[10,000 ∞) 18.30 4.81 0.303 ** 4.77 36.85 17.42 0.27 0.103 ** 5.84 37.73
R N 1% (0 499] 14.63 −12.35 −0.245 ** 41.59 6.50 18.21 −4.80 −0.024 36.51 5.64
[500 9,999] 66.98 7.16 0.230 ** 53.49 55.99 64.66 4.13 0.061 ** 57.45 55.95
[10,000∞) 18.39 5.19 0.219 ** 4.93 37.50 17.13 0.66 0.039 ** 6.04 38.42
Panel B: 2005 data
All days (0 499] 60.23 −11.08 −0.166 77.98 38.96 57.65 −7.77 −0.094 75.63 38.31
[500 9,999] 35.50 9.46 0.195 ** 21.63 49.16 37.42 9.36 0.083 ** 23.84 51.20
[10,000 ∞) 4.27 1.62 0.115 ** 0.39 11.88 4.93 −1.59 0.032 * 0.53 10.49
R N 1% (0 499] 48.53 −16.78 −0.153 76.32 35.94 32.22 −12.83 −0.460 ** 73.76 35.29
[500 9,999] 44.66 14.96 0.492 ** 23.18 50.17 57.74 15.06 0.767 ** 25.54 52.09
[10,000 ∞) 6.81 1.82 0.310 ** 0.50 13.89 10.04 −2.23 0.437 ** 0.70 12.62
‡ Us ing Lee and Ready (1991).
* (**) means p-value b 0.05 (0.01).
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NYSE BBO. The small-size trades’ coefﬁcient (α) is negative and highly signiﬁcant for the 1995 consolidated trades and quotes. For
the 2005 sample, the sign of α is consistent with the downward bias in WPC but only signiﬁcant with NYSE BBO and on days with
strictly positive returns.
8. Summary and conclusions
Introduced by Barclay andWarner (1993), theWPC approach has been extensively used to evaluate strategic fragmentation of or-
ders and price leadership. Recently, van Bommel (2011) uses simulated data to question the unbiasedness of theWPC approach in the
presence of serial correlation in the price changes. van Bommel focuses on the use of the WPC in low-frequency analyses about price
leadership. In this paper, we extend this line of research. Firstly, we introduce a simple methodology to obtain friction-free WPC es-
timates using high-frequency data. Secondly, we generalize van Bommel’s result by showing that theWPC approach generates biased
estimates in the presence of a general friction-related component in price changes.
Our friction-freeWPC approach (WPC), builds on Hasbrouck (1991). In a ﬁrst step, we use quote midpoints instead of trade prices
to get rid of the bid-ask bounce effect. In a second step, we use a time-series econometric model to extract the friction-related dynam-
ics in the time series of the quote midpoint change. The resulting times series of friction-free quote midpoint changes is then used to
compute the WPC.
To illustrate the usefulness of our approach,we study strategic fragmentation of orders in the electronic trading platform of the SSE
applying both the traditional WPC approach and the new WPC approach. We use high-frequency data from July 2000 to December
2006. We report a signiﬁcant −38.7% friction-related bias in the WPC of small-size trades in the SSE. The bias increases to
−72.71% if we restrict our analysis to days with open-to-close returns above 1%. We therefore show that the WPC is not robust to
trading frictions and the bias is more notorious when stealth trading is more likely to occur.
Most of the friction-related bias (85.6%) is driven by the bid-ask bounce, but bid-ask-bounce-unrelated serial correlationmarkedly
adds to the bias. Therefore, although replacing price changes by quotemidpoint changesmay correctmost of the friction-related bias,
theWPCapproach guaranteesmore precise estimates.Moreover, themagnitude of the bias depends on the time resolution of theWPC
analysis. In contrast, the WPC estimates obtained for alternative time resolutions are alike.
We show that negative WPCs for small-size trades, commonly found in US and non-US studies during the 80s and 90s, can be at-
tributed to trading frictions rather than underperformance by retail traders, as it is often assumed.We also document that the friction-
related bias can distort formal tests of the stealth trading hypothesis.
We study the role that trade-aggressiveness plays in explaining the downward bias in theWPC of small-size trades in the SSE.We
ﬁnd that non-aggressive trades,which aremore common among small size trades, frequently add noise to theWPC. In fact, the down-
ward bias only affects to small-size non-aggressive trades (−49.1%). In days with strictly positive returns, small- and medium-size
aggressive trades disproportionally contribute to price discovery.
Finally, we show that the friction-related bias inWPC is notmarket-speciﬁc. Using 1995 and 2005 NYSE-listed US stocks, we ﬁnd a
downward-biasedWPC for small-size trades, but of smallermagnitude than for the SSE. The bias is larger if we use consolidated trades
238 D. Abad, R. Pascual / International Review of Economics and Finance 37 (2015) 226–239and quotes rather thanNYSE trades andquotes alone. Because of inherent limitations of theMonthly TAQdatabase, however, wemust
treat the US ﬁndings with caution.
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